Past Event

The state of the policy debate on the EU crisis management and deposit insurance framework

This members-only event welcomes Jan Reinder De Carpentier, Vice-Chair of the Single Resolution Board for a conversation with an invited audience.

Date: March 25, 2021, 2:00 pm Topic: Banking and capital markets

At this invitation-only event we welcome Jan Reinder De Carpentier, Vice-Chair of the Single Resolution Board (SRB). He will engage in a conversation with Bruegel members and selected invitees. The conversation will be moderated by Nicolas Véron.

This event is part of a monthly series of events focusing on finance, open to Bruegel members and a small number of institutional stakeholders.

Schedule

Mar 25, 2021

14:00 CET

Conversation

Chair: Nicolas Véron, Senior Fellow

Jan Reinder De Carpentier, Vice-chair, Single Resolution Board (SRB)

Speakers

Nicolas Véron

Senior Fellow

Jan Reinder De Carpentier

Vice-chair, Single Resolution Board (SRB)

Location & Contact

Bruegel, Rue de la Charité 33, 1210 Brussels

Matilda Sevon

[email protected]

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Blog Post

Can the gap in the Europe’s internal market for banking services be bridged?

The European Union has made significant progress to a more unified banking market but frictions remain between euro and non-euro countries. Without a coordinated approach to remaining issues in completing banking union, the gap could widen.

By: Thomas Wieser Topic: Banking and capital markets Date: December 7, 2020
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Past Event

Past Event

The resurrection of the European Banking Union

At this event, Luis Garicano, member of the European Parliament, presented his two proposals to resurrect the European Banking Union: "a Safe Portfolio" and "a Single Resolution Board +".

Speakers: Tom Dechaene, Luis Garicano, Michala Marcussen, Guntram B. Wolff and Bruegel Topic: Banking and capital markets Location: Bruegel, Rue de la Charité 33, 1210 Brussels Date: February 20, 2020
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External Publication

European Parliament

Impediments to resolvability of banks

This paper gives an overview of the seven aspects of resolvability defined in 2019 by the Single Resolution Board, and then assesses progress in two key areas, based on evidence gathered from public disclosures made by the 20 largest euro-area banks. The largest banks have made good progress in raising bail-in capital. Changes to banks’ legal and operational structures that will facilitate resolution will take more time. Greater transparency would make it easier to achieve the policy objective of making banks resolvable.

By: Alexander Lehmann and Bruegel Topic: European Parliament Date: December 18, 2019
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Policy Contribution

Crisis management for euro-area banks in central Europe

Euro-area bank integration has decreased as post-financial crisis national rules require banks to hold more capital at home. It might be undermined further by bank resolution planning. Either a Single Resolution Board takes the lead for the entire banking group or independent local intervention schemes need to be developed for crisis resolution.

By: Alexander Lehmann and Bruegel Topic: Banking and capital markets, Macroeconomic policy Date: November 19, 2019
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External Publication

An Effective Regime for Non-viable Banks: US Experience and Considerations for EU Reform

The US regime for non-viable banks has maintained a high degree of stability and public confidence by protecting deposits, while working to minimise the public cost of that protection. EU reformers can draw valuable insights from the US experience. A review of the US regime supports arguments in favour of harmonisation and centralisation of bank insolvency proceedings and deposit insurance in Europe’s banking union.

By: Anna Gelpern, Nicolas Véron and Bruegel Topic: Banking and capital markets Date: July 22, 2019
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Blog Post

European bank resolution plans are undermined by a lack of transparency

The discussions of the now-aborted merger of Germany’s two largest banks underlined supervisors’ concerns over creating banks that are too big or too complex to fail. While European banks are increasingly funded through securities that could be subject to a bail-in, transparency over how any resolutions would unfold is as yet very poor.

By: Alexander Lehmann Topic: Banking and capital markets Date: May 15, 2019
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Blog Post

Developing resilient bail-in capital

Europe’s largest banks have made progress in issuing bail-inable securities that shelter taxpayers from bank failures. But the now-finalised revision of the bank resolution directive and a new policy of the SRB will make requirements to issue such securities more onerous for other banks. In order to strengthen banking-system resilience, EU capital-market regulation should facilitate exposures of long-term institutional investors.

By: Bruegel and Alexander Lehmann Topic: Banking and capital markets Date: April 29, 2019
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External Publication

European Parliament

Taking stock of the Single Resolution Board: Banking union scrutiny

The Single Resolution Board (SRB) has had a somewhat difficult start but has been able to learn and adapt, and has gained stature following its first bank resolution decisions in 2017-18. It must continue to build up its capabilities, even as the European Union’s banking union and its policy regime for unviable banks continue to develop.

By: Nicolas Véron and Bruegel Topic: European Parliament, Macroeconomic policy, Testimonies Date: April 18, 2019
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Blog Post

Providing funding in resolution: Unfinished business even after Eurogroup agreement on EMU reform

The recent Eurogroup agreement on euro-area reform foresees a greater role for the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as a backstop to the banking union. This is a welcome step forward but important issues remain. We assess the agreement on how to fund banks after resolution and the best way to organise the fiscal role in liquidity provisioning to banks. We argue that the bank resolution framework will remain incomplete and its gaps could result in important financial instabilities.

By: Maria Demertzis and Guntram B. Wolff Topic: Macroeconomic policy Date: December 7, 2018
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External Publication

European Parliament

How to provide liquidity to banks after resolution in Europe’s banking union

Banks deemed to be failing or likely to fail in the banking union are either put into insolvency/liquidation or enter a resolution scheme to protect the public interest. After resolution but before full market confidence is restored, the liquidity needs of resolved banks might exceed what can be met through regular monetary policy operations or emergency liquidity assistance. All liquidity needs that emerge must be met for resolution to be a success. In the euro area, this can only be done credibly for systemically important banks by the central bank.

By: Maria Demertzis, Inês Goncalves Raposo, Pia Hüttl and Guntram B. Wolff Topic: European Parliament, Macroeconomic policy, Testimonies Date: November 22, 2018
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Opinion

Building a stable european deposit insurance scheme

Deposit insurance, like any insurance scheme, raises moral hazard concerns. Such concerns arising from European deposit insurance can be alleviated through a country-specific component in the risk-based premium for deposit insurance and limits on sovereign bond exposures on bank balance sheets. This column argues, however, that proposals to maintain national compartments in a new European Deposit Insurance Scheme are self-defeating, as such compartments can be destabilising in times of crisis.

By: Dirk Schoenmaker Topic: Banking and capital markets Date: April 19, 2018
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Blog Post

Latvia’s money laundering scandal

Latvia’s third largest bank ABLV sought emergency liquidity from the ECB and eventually voted to start a process of voluntary liquidation, after being accused by US authorities of large-scale money laundering and having failed to produce a survival plan. What does it mean for the ECB?

By: Silvia Merler and Bruegel Topic: Banking and capital markets Date: April 9, 2018
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